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Abstract 
 
The financial crisis has affected the landscape of the banking sector around the world. We use a sample of 
transactions taking place in Europe in 2007-2010 to study the acquirer’s stock price market reaction to 
announcements and completions of acquisitions. We find that there are no significant abnormal returns 
around the announcement of an acquisition while there are positive abnormal returns at completions. We 
study the cross-sectional determinants of abnormal returns and find that announcement returns are mainly 
explained by the acquirer bank characteristics, while completion returns depend on opacity of the target and 
in large part on the drop in volatility associated with a reduction of uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Acquisitions in the banking sector may be driven by a multiplicity of factors among which are: 
(i) exploiting economies of scale associated with centralizing functions like IT, cash management, 
personnel, (ii)  exerting market power and imposing better pricing conditions on customers, (iii) 
pursuing geographical diversification that brings benefits in terms of risk reduction, (iv) taking 
advantage from implicit subsidies connected with a too-big-to-fail (TBTF)1 status, (v) managers 
maximizing their own utility function rather than the shareholders utility function.  
Empirical studies of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) usually show that abnormal returns 
around the announcement date are negative for acquirers and positive for targets, see e.g. Spyrou 
and Siougle (2010), Campa and Hernando (2006), Karceski, Ongena and Smith (2005). However, 
recent evidence is not totally consistent with these results. Moeller and Faelton (2009)2 show that, 
since 2008, acquirers have significantly positive abnormal returns around the date of either 
announcement or completion. In their review of the post-2000 literature, DeYoung et al. (2009) 
come to the conclusion that “North American bank mergers are (or can be) efficiency improving. 
European bank mergers appear to have resulted in both efficiency gains and stockholder value 
enhancement”. Moreover, Netter, Stegemoller and Wintoki (2011) show that some of the results 
found in the literature may be sample specific and may not hold for a wider sample with a higher 
representation of private bidders and small targets. 
In this paper we contribute to the literature by studying the cross-sectional determinants of stock 
returns to acquirers in the banking sector during the recent credit crisis. We focus on acquisitions in 
the banking sector in the European Union that have been completed or terminated over the  period 
2007-2010. This sample period is particularly interesting because transactions may have involved 
banks that were sufficiently strong to take advantage – at a time of liquidity shortage - of forced  
sales from weaker competitors. We make two conjectures: first, in a buyer’s market, positive 
                                                 
1 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) find that some banks may have grown to a size that prevents them from gaining 
benefits from the TBTF characteristic. 
2 See also Towers Watson and Cass Business School, 2011, Quarterly Deal Performance Q1 2001, April. 
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abnormal returns should be easier to detect than in normal periods, and, second, opacity of banks 
balance sheets may have been particularly relevant at this time so that the combination of greater 
overall uncertainty and asset opacity may have caused investors to be more cautious in reacting to 
the announcement and attaching some value to completion of the process. 
To elaborate on these hypotheses we notice that crises may represent opportunities for strong 
banks. Healthy banks, particularly from the point of view of capital and liquidity, have an 
opportunity to improve their market share and profitability during crises, see Berger and Bouwman 
(2008), and may shop around and buy competitors at distressed prices. Acharya, Shin and 
Yorulmazer (2011) claim that the gains from acquiring assets at fire-sale prices during a crisis is 
one of the reasons explaining bank holdings of liquid assets in normal times. Acquisitions at times 
of crises may therefore imply positive abnormal returns as acquirers would be able to achieve 
portfolio diversification (Emmons et al. 2004), geographic diversification (Hughes et al. 1999), 
activity diversification (Van Lelyveld and Knot 2009) and market power (Hankir et al. 2011) at low 
prices. A reduction in the number of potential bidders and an increase in the number of potential 
targets, typical of crisis periods, may also allow stock prices to more clearly reflect advantages for 
the acquirers see James and Wier (1987). At the aggregate level, a negative effect on abnormal 
returns can be associated with acquisitions that are forced by regulators. It is recognized, see e.g. 
Koetter et al (2007), that M&A in banking may also be due interventions on the part of regulators 
and generally involves financially weak target banks. Acquisitions in the banking sector during the 
crisis may have been motivated by an attempt on the part of the public sector to prevent bank 
failures and to limit the extent of public interventions (see e.g. Group of Thirty, 2009). This would 
be coherent with finding negative abnormal returns, perhaps due to increases in risk3, for acquirers 
that may have been forced to intervene due to external pressure from regulators. 
                                                 
3 Vallascas and Hegendorff (2011) study a sample of 134 acquisitions in Europe and find that mergers on average do 
not affect risk as measured by the distance to default, but that relatively safe banks suffer from an increase in risk 
following the announcement of the deal, particularly for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals and deals 
completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. 
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As to uncertainty and opacity, we conjecture that opacity of bank assets may have been relevant 
during the crisis and therefore that there may have been particular value in the due diligence process 
carried out by the acquiring bank. Assets in banking are widely recognized to be opaque. Flannery, 
Kwan and Nimalendran (2010) recognize the increase in bank opacity at the beginning of the 
financial crisis. The crisis was propagated by the diffusion of mortgage-backed securities that were 
present in the balance sheets of several banks. Uncertainty about the holdings of such securities may 
have been an important cause of information asymmetry and a relevant valuation factor.  An 
acquisition implies a careful due diligence that externally certifies the value of the target. This 
activity is particularly valuable in sectors and at times when investors are more uncertain about the 
value of assets. Jones, Lee and Yeager (2011) find that revaluations associated with merger 
announcements in 2000-2006 carry positive information for banks particularly exposed to opaque 
assets. During the crisis, the due diligence process carried out by acquirers may therefore have been 
particularly valuable to clarify the relevance of target’s low-quality assets and this may have had an 
impact on returns. A further reason why completion may be a significant event for investors is that 
there is a positive probability - consistent with the activity of merger arbitrageurs4 - that a deal does 
not materialize in ordinary times, and even more so at a time of financial distress, when information 
asymmetry and sudden adverse changes could enhance the likelihood to terminate the transaction5.  
Lorenz and Schiereck (2007) find that investors are able to correctly assess the probability of 
realization already on the announcement day and that they then appreciate the successful closing of 
the deal providing a premium to the bidder (the reverse holds true in case of termination). Indeed 
deal closing/termination events take away uncertainty, provide new information about the 
preliminary purchase price and about unknown financial data which has been learnt during the due 
diligence.  
                                                 
4 The relevance  of merger arbitrage, an investment  strategy  providing insurance to target firm shareholders against 
deal failures, has been  ascertained by Pulvino et al. (2004) among others.    
5 Between 1990 and 2010  around 5% of the worldwide announced deals in the banking sector were cancelled with 
peaks of 12.5%  in a financially advanced country such as Norway. 
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We find that abnormal returns for bank acquirers are zero on average after announcements but 
positive after the date of completion. Cross-sectionally, abnormal returns at the announcement date 
are mainly explained by bank characteristics.  Abnormal returns are larger for more efficient banks, 
banks with higher profitability and with less leverage. Buying a national target and implementing a 
friendly deal have also a positive impact on abnormal returns. Interestingly, and contrary to what 
found in previous literature, idiosyncratic volatility is not relevant and paying in cash is bad for 
abnormal returns. The latter finding runs contrary to the signalling hypothesis and could be due to 
investors being disappointed by the choice of the acquirer to use cash at times of a credit and 
liquidity crisis. Furthermore, we find that abnormal returns after completion are explained by 
several factors usually related to the likelihood of merger termination, among which we find the 
opacity of the target, the size of the deal, and the effectiveness of the national supervision. The 
speed of information dissemination after closing is associated with the number of analysts 
monitoring the acquirer’s activity and the size of the deal. Ten-day CARs are related with the pre-
completion increase in volatility. Importantly, we find that terminated deals have a negative impact 
on acquirer’s abnormal returns, while bank concentration has a positive influence. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the hypothesis related 
to the variables used herein. Section 3 includes a sample description and a preliminary analysis of 
the acquirer abnormal returns. Section 4 provides more complete analyses of the relations between 
acquirer cumulative CAR and other covariates at different time windows. Finally, we discuss the 
implications of our results and provide concluding remarks in Section 5.  
 
2. Data and hypotheses. 
Our data6 are taken from various sources. The dependent variables are abnormal returns over 
different windows. Our aim is to explain abnormal returns both  at announcement and completion 
dates. The reason why we look at abnormal returns at completion is due to our study encompassing 
                                                 
6 Appendix A contains definition of the variables as well as the specific source. 
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the financial crisis time period. During a financial crisis, opacity of bank assets and sudden material 
changes could imply a higher probability that the due diligence process carried out by potential 
acquirers may convey a negative result. This may warrant a market reaction after completion. The 
potential relevance of completions is consistent with the relevance of deal announcements. 
Especially during a crisis, announcing an acquisition could be regarded as good news if it is 
interpreted as a signal of financial health. However, after the announcement, uncertainty goes up 
and is resolved at the time of the closing. Our hypothesis is that completion announcements are 
value relevant during a financial crisis, especially for opaque targets and in cases where there is a 
lower probability of completion. To measure opacity, lacking any information on specific categories 
of loans, we construct a dummy variable (Transparency) representing the availability of 
information on the target economic conditions. The dummy  has  a maximum  value of  four, when  
information on target economic conditions is fully available, and a minimum of 0 in the opposite 
case.  It  scores 1 point for information available on any of the following categories for the ratget;  
(1) Tier 1, ROE and ROA;  (2) EPS growth, Sales per Diluted Share 1 yr Growth; (3) multiple 
equity ratios (for example, book-market ratio) (4) efficiency ratio.  
The  likelihood to successfully conclude a deal is enhanced when the acquisition is friendly and 
the focus is on national targets. Beitel et al. (2003) find that domestic mergers, by signalling higher 
likelihood of ex ante sinergy (e.g., more cost savings) are both more understandable for capital 
markets and get easily approved by shareholders. Similarly when a deal is made on a friendly basis 
it is plausible to expect that the due diligence process will be quicker and reliable. In the paper 
National is a dummy variable taking the value of one when the acquirer and the target headquarter 
are located in the same country and Friendly is a dummy variable taking the value of one  when the 
deal is announced to be friendly towards the target’s managers. 
We also conjecture that speed of information dissemination about M&A deals is likely to be 
positively related to the number of analysts monitoring the acquirer’s activity and negatively to 
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minors deal carried out by less monitored acquirers, so we control for that (Analysts and Minors no 
coverage) in our regressions. 
Asymmetric information is relevant in M&As. The choice of the payment may reveal private 
information known by the bidder. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, given the access to 
privileged information by the managers of the bidder firm, cash is chosen as a mean of payment 
only if the firm's shares are undervalued. There are of course other explanations for the role of the 
method of payment. From a corporate governance point of view, cash payment is used when 
acquiring managers have large ownership and highly value firm’s control (Amihud et al. 1990). 
Finally, the use of cash may deter competing offers for the target firm when the cost of collecting  
information about the target is high (Fishman 1989). It follows that a cash-financed merger attempt 
enhances the likelihood of  a merger completion as also suggested by Branch  et al. (2003).7 In our 
analysis, Cash is a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the deal is paid cash or debt and 
zero otherwise. 
We consider idiosyncratic volatility (Volatility) as a proxy for asymmetric information. Moeller 
et al. (2007) find that idiosyncratic volatility is a powerful proxy for asymmetric information. Our 
hypothesis is that idiosyncratic volatility during financial crises may also represent uncertainty 
related to the successful conclusion of the deal. To account for the increase in uncertainty over the 
completion period we use Delta volatility, equal to the ratio between idiosyncratic volatility from 
one day after the announcement to one day prior the completion and idiosyncratic volatility from 35 
to 5 days before the announcement. If idiosyncratic volatility is priced, its increase should be 
associated with a decrease in prices. 
We use several acquirer characteristics as control variables8. Efficiency is defined as the ratio 
between expenditures and total revenues, ROE is the return on equity,  PB is the price to book ratio, 
                                                 
7 Moreover Moeller et al. (2007) find that abnormal returns associated with acquisition of public firms paid for with 
cash (equity offers) increase (decease) with idiosyncratic volatility. Faccio and Masulis (2005) explain acquisition 
financing on the basis of the bidder corporate control and the acquirer financial strength. Moeller (2005) shows that 
cash payments are associated with higher acquisition premiums than are transactions using other methods of payments. 
Chen et al. (2011) consider the relevance of timing the acquisition announcement and its effect on payment methods. 
8 Bank characteristics are measured at the end of the year before the announcement of the deal. 
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and Assets is the log of total assets. Various measures of  leverage are also considered: tangible 
equity to asset ratio orthogonalized with respect to size (Equity), the ratio between the sum of short term 
and long term funding and total assets (Leverage), the debt to equity ratio (Debteq)  and an indicator 
of funding fragility equal to the ratio between the sum of deposits from other banks, other deposits 
and short term borrowing over total deposits plus money market and short term funding (Fragility). 
Healthy acquirers are expected to have higher chances to close the deal with  a success and this is 
likely to be acknowledged by market participants. Among the remaining deal’s features, Terminated 
is a dummy variable taking the value of one when deal is not completed; Public is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one when the target is public, Dummy 0309 takes the value of one if the 
deal is concluded after March 2009 (i.e when banks start recovering from the losses recorded in end 
2007-2008). 
The degree of concentration in the banking sector may be relevant. Higher concentration implies 
fewer effective bidders, which enhance the pricing power of the acquirer (James and Wier, 1987). 
Moreover banks may use M&A exactly to achieve pricing power. We use Concentration, defined as 
the ratio between the assets of the three largest commercial banks to total market asset in the 
acquirer country as a measure of bank concentration. 
It is often claimed that bank acquisitions during a financial crisis may be due to the intervention 
of the regulator that forces healthy banks to buy troubled organizations. As a proxy for the power of 
regulators to enforce socially useful acquisitions, we use Official, an index of the power of the 
commercial bank supervisory agency, including the rights of the supervisor to meet with and 
demand information from auditors, to force a bank to change the internal organizational structure, to 
supersede the rights of shareholders, and to intervene in a bank. 
Finally, we allow for international differences in corporate governance. Doige at al (2007) 
suggest that inter-country differences in governance are relevant for financial markets. The impact 
of Governance indicators in M&A has recently been studied by Ellis et al (2011) who find that 
acquirers from countries with better governance gain more from cross border acquisitions. Like 
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Ellis et al. (2011) we also use the World Governance Indicators representing the degree of control 
of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice 
and accountability. We expect that acquirers with better governance indicators have larger abnormal 
returns associated with M&A transactions.    
 
3. Sample Description and Preliminary Analysis. 
3.1 Sample description. 
From the inception of the crisis onwards, international flows of M&A in the banking sector have 
shrunk considerably with respect to levels reached in 2007. Over the period 2007-2008, the 
European financial sector recorded 292 announced deals  for a total value of €345bn. 2009 saw a 
steep decline in financial services deal-making to €80bn (only 49 deals have involved banking 
targets and, excluding government’s activity, the number fell to 11 transactions.) During 2010 
financial sector M&A deal value dropped to €50bn (of which €30bn in  banking) due to a sharp 
reduction in government led transactions which was only partially compensated by the revival of 
the private sector activity9.  
This downward trend is mainly due to both the credit crisis that put European banks under 
funding pressure and the lack of clearly defined national anti-crisis measures. Thus, banks which 
found themselves in financial difficulty due to lack of liquidity or equity capital were likely become 
prey to acquirers; banks unscathed by the crisis found themselves in a much stronger position, when 
considering M&A activity, given the diminishing number of competitors. 
Our sample involves acquisitions of banks (subsidiaries or branches) by acquirer banks whose 
headquarter is located in EU, Switzerland and Norway. The related information is taken from 
Bloomberg and limited to deals with announcement and completion - or terminated - date between 
January 2007- November 2010. By limiting the analysis to deals valued higher than 15mln euro10 
and involving public acquirers we restrict the sample to 131 completed  and 8 terminated deals,  for 
                                                 
9 Source PWC European Financial services M&A insight several issues (2008-2011) 
10 In case of undisclosed value (28% of the sample) the estimated value of the deal is higher or equal to €15 mln.   
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a total of 139 observations. Among the largest deals included in our database it is worth mentioning 
the acquisition of Capitalia by Unicredit SpA (announced deal value €21.935 bn), the attempted 
acquisitions of ABN Amro by Barclays (€67.824bn) and of  Banco Comercial Portugues SA by 
Banco BPI SA (€11.574bn);  the acquisition of  Banca Antonveneta SpA by Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena (€9 bn) and the merger between Hypo Real Estate Holding AG and Depfa Bank PLC 
(€5.622bn),  To retrieve returns on individual equities and market indices we use Datastream 
(Thomson Reuters). The majority of our sample (56%) includes privately held targets. Acquirer and 
target characteristics (financial ratios) are computed on data available from Bankscope. Nationwide 
features, such as legal origin and governance index are obtained from World Governance Indicators 
2010 and Andrei Sleifer’s database  available on his webpage. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE> 
Table 1 reports descriptive features of the transactions under exam. The average value of 
transactions included in our sample is €1,682 mn11. The difference between average values in the 
two sub-periods 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 is not statistically significant.  Completion time is not 
statistically different in the two sub-periods. In unreported results, we however find that at the peak 
of the crisis (July 2007- December 2008), deals took a significantly longer time to be completed 
than deals concluded before July 20007 or after December 2008 (108.98  vs 54.87 days)12. It is not 
hard to think of several potential explanations for the latter finding, for example funding problems 
and/or a more difficult due diligence assessment related to a combination of asset opacity and 
disruptions in prices of assets like loans and mortgage baked securities. 
Over the sample, most transactions (54.68%) refer to firms belonging to the same business 
subgroup13, are paid in cash (50.36%) and are proposed on a friendly basis (60.43%). Overall, only 
                                                 
11 The average deal value without the terminated offer of Barclays amounts to €1,233 mn. 
12 The t test of mean difference for the days between  announcement and completion  rejects  the null of mean equality 
at any probability level greater than 0.09 % (student t=-3.41). 
 
13 For acquirer banks, the subgroups included in the group “banks” are: commercial banks non US; cooperative banks; 
diversified banking institutions; mortgage banks; regional banks non US. As for targets the subgroups included in the 
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in 36% of deals, acquirers and  targets are located in the same country (50% in the second sub-
period) and - in the majority of cases - targets are located outside the EU. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE> 
Table 2 provides the geographic dispersion of acquirers and targets. Bidders located in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK were the most active during the period 2007-2010. Italy, 
Germany, Spain, Ukraine and Russia are the five countries where most targets came from. Italy is 
the country with the most frequent domestic transactions followed by Germany, France and Spain. 
The UK has the highest number of deals involving targets in “other countries”, a label that refers to 
a group of several emerging countries.  
 
3.2 Evidence on cumulative abnormal returns. 
In order to examine the effect of M&As on the acquirer/target share value most event studies 
rely on the concept of abnormal returns defined as the raw stock return minus some required return 
based on a model such as the CAPM or a simpler Market index. The focus here  is on  Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) and on Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACARs) around the 
Announcement or Completion date. They are computed - at different window-size - using the 
Eurostoxx bank index as market index. 
Table 3 shows that abnormal returns are significantly positive around the completion date if we 
consider windows starting five or ten days before completion and ending ten days after completion. 
For example in the twenty days centred around the event, average cumulative abnormal returns 
amount to a very large 2.3%. Interestingly, abnormal returns of a similar magnitude are observed 
over the twenty days after the event. Abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero for 
windows of five days or less. As we will show in our cross-sectional analyses, this long reaction lag 
can be explained by delays in the production of information 
                                                                                                                                                                  
group banks are: commercial banks non US; commercial banks US; cooperative banks; diversified banking institutions; 
money center banks,  mortgage banks; regional banks non US; special purpose banks.         
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At announcement dates, cumulative abnormal returns are statistically insignificant. This can be 
coherent with a situation where acquisitions are partly motivated by exploiting opportunities on the 
part of stronger banks and partly induced by regulators actions that try to preserve the stability of 
the banking system. The statistical relevance of  abnormal returns for windows [-10,+10] and [-
10,+5] is mainly due to statistically significant and on average positive abnormal returns for the 
window [-10,-5]. This may be interpreted as information leakage related to insiders.  
<INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE> 
 We implement a multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis where the dependent variable 
is the abnormal return of the bidders. The variables are defined in the appendix  and their summary 
statistics are contained in Table 4. We winsorize bank-level explanatory variables  and volatility 
measures at the 1%  and 99% levels. 
<INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE> 
 In our cross section OLS-regressions we control for fixed effects, for multi-collinearity using 
variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerances for individual variables and for a non-diagonal 
covariance matrix by robust standard errors.  
 
4. The determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
4.1 CARs around announcement 
We use the window [-1,+1] to compare our results with the extant literature. Table 5 reports the 
results of several specifications and highlights that acquirers’ financial strength and deal features 
have the most relevant role and are able to explain  around 20% of the dependent variable variance. 
< INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE> 
Contrary to what happens in most of the existing literature, the sign of cash is negative across all 
the specifications. An acquirer paying by cash has a return of over -1% less than an acquirer that 
does not use cash. Our interpretation is that cash payment depletes the bidder’s liquidity buffer in 
exchange for a risky asset (the ownership of the target). Thus cash payments, by reducing the 
 14
bidder’s distance to default  (Vallascas and Hegendorff 2011), could produce a negative impact on 
cumulative abnormal returns, particularly during a crisis when the marginal value of cash is likely 
to be higher than in normal times. The credit crisis has largely been a liquidity crisis. Many analyses 
of the crisis have emphasized the run on the funding of banks that relied on short-term finance in 
the capital markets for a substantial fraction of their financing (see, for instance, Gorton (2010), and 
Diamond and Rajan (2009)). Our results therefore show that during a liquidity crisis it is therefore 
negative to use cash to finance an acquisition.  
We try to better understand this result by using a dummy for the period August 2008-mid 
October 2008, corresponding to a period of high liquidity stress on the European interbank market. 
In unreported results, cash  turns out to be  negative during the crisis but irrelevant otherwise14, 
coherently with our hypothesis that the crisis has affected the traditional role of the payment 
method. Some banks could have decided to use cash rather than issuing stocks for good reasons. 
Banks may have felt that stock prices were depressed and did not provide a correct evaluation of the 
assets, therefore they prefer to use cash rather than to signal the stock has room to drop farther. 
Investors themselves may have been cash-constrained during the crisis and therefore not willing to 
join capital-raising efforts on the part of corporations.. 
The return on equity and leverage (as represented by Equity)15, both interpreted as indicators of 
financial strength, have  a positive  impact on CARs. Beltratti and Stulz (2011) also find that 
leverage was an important factor for the determination of bank stock returns during the crisis, with 
banks with higher tangible equity better resisting to the crisis. Investors may have concluded that 
banks with better capital and profitability were in a better position to exploit synergies arising from 
the acquisition.  
Deal features also contribute significantly to explaining the variance of the dependent variable. 
Friendly acquisitions and transactions where both the acquirer and the target are located in the same 
                                                 
14  Indeed only the dummy variable representing the liquidity crisis period and its interaction with cash, but not the cash standalone,  
are significantly different from zero.             
15 In table 5 leverage is computed as the ratio of tangible equity to asset orthogonalized with respect to the bidder’s size, 
as in Vallascas et Hegendorff (2011), but the use of alternative measures (see section 4.3) does not affect the result. 
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country are positive elements for abnormal returns. Our interpretation is that both factors reduce 
deal’s opacity and enhance the likelihood of success.  
Differently from Moeller  et al. (2007), idiosyncratic volatility is not relevant. Either 
idiosyncratic volatility is not a good proxy for asymmetry of information during the crisis or 
asymmetric information does not play a direct role. Our finding that cash has a negative coefficient 
is indeed consistent with the latter interpretation. Other control variables that are included in the 
various specifications of table 5 are not significant. 
4.2 CARs after completion 
We now turn to abnormal returns after completion. We  focus on CARs computed  at two event 
windows: the day after the closing [0,+1], to evaluate the direct impact of the news, and ten days 
after the closing [0,+10] to investigate the forces responsible for the accumulation of highly 
significant positive abnormal returns displayed in table 3.    
Several factors play a role immediately after completion/termination. 
<INSERT  TABLE 6a AROUND HERE> 
CARs are positively affected by a reversal effect associated with abnormal returns between the 
announcement and the completion dates, the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, 
differences in regulatory quality between acquirer and target country, target’s opacity and deal size. 
Indeed, Caiazza and Pozzolo show that these variables are usually correlated with merger failure. It 
follows that when a transaction with the previous characteristics is concluded rather than terminated  
the market perceives this information as a positive piece of news. 
The negative sign of Transparency is in line with our conjecture that target’s opacity was 
relevant during the crisis. Investors bid up the prices of acquirers when these succeeded in 
purchasing opaque targets. On the other hand, investors reacted more strongly when a larger 
number of analysts study the bank and when the size of the deal is large. It makes sense that 
reaction is more immediate when there are more analysts and when the deal is more visible in the 
market. 
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For the event window [0, +10], the average cumulative abnormal return for our sample of 139 
acquirers is 1.5%, corresponding to an annualized value of 37.5%.  
<INSERT  TABLE 6b AROUND HERE> 
The regressions in table 6b generally show that returns after completion are mainly explained by 
factors that are directly connected to the market environment  rather than to acquirer characteristics. 
The only relevant deal characteristic is the cash dummy which exerts a negative influence on 
abnormal returns, consistent with the impact at the announcement. It is however puzzling that cash 
has no significant effect at the [0, +1] window.  
Bank concentration of the acquirer is positive and significant. This is easily understandable 
when the acquirer and the target have the same nationality, as lack of competition implies fewer 
effective bidders and this enhances the pricing power of the acquirer (James and Wier, 1987).  One 
might wonder why bank concentration should be relevant in cases of international transactions. We 
conjecture that in these cases cross border acquisitions could be  positively appreciated by the 
market as they signal the bidder’s wish to purse growth abroad rather than in an overcrowded 
domestic market. 
The ratio between idiosyncratic volatility in the period between completion and announcement 
and idiosyncratic volatility before the announcement is significantly positive. Remember from table 
4 that idiosyncratic volatility on average significantly goes up from 9.54% to 10.63% after the 
announcement. The increase is temporary, because after completion volatility reverts to the pre-
announcement level16. Regression results in table 6b show that a volatility increase predicts a 
positive abnormal return. This result is consistent with the literature measuring a negative relation 
between returns and idiosyncratic volatility, see Ang et al. (2006) and Peterson and Smedema 
(2011). In our sample, high idiosyncratic volatility before completion is associated with a 
                                                 
16 The F variance test between the variance in the period before the announcement (vol1_idio) and the variance in the period between 
announcement and completion (vol2_idio) rejects the null hypothesis of equality in 21% of the cases instead of 5% (significance 
level of the test) while the F test between the annualized volatility in the period before the announcement and the variance after 
completion accepts the null of equality in 92% of the cases  (test with a significance level of 5%).   The results is qualitatively the 
same applying the test on the log volatility.  
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contemporaneous low return and low idiosyncratic volatility after completion is associated with a 
high return. This is coherent with a mispricing story and arbitrageurs demanding a return to correct 
mispricing, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
In addition, Dummy 0309 and Terminated have a significant negative impact on CARs after 
completion, consistently with the hypothesis that investors only recognize the value creation 
potential of banks able to bring to success the transaction during time of distress. Indeed deals 
completed/terminated after March 2009, which marks the recovery of the EU banking sector, are 
associated to diminishing abnormal returns.  Interestingly the deal size and the dummy representing 
the number of analysts (i.e the accuracy and speed of information dissemination) are not relevant 
here. On the contrary, the variable representing minor deals (valued less than 250mln euros) with no 
coverage by analysts (Minors  no coverage) stands out as highly significant, consistent with our 
conjecture that the time needed to build up a significantly positive  abnormal  returns is mainly due 
to delays in information dissemination.  
            
4.3 Robustness analysis 
We run a variety of robustness tests. We estimate a set of regressions where the dependent 
variable is regressed on core variables - which are included in every specifications- and all possible 
combinations of testing variables.  The selection of  the core variables is somehow arbitrary, being 
represented by the the explicative factors that show a higher significance level in the  original 
estimation. The reduction of variables  considered “core” simply allows  to run a larger number of  
alternative specifications without modifying the interpretation of the exercise. 
<INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE> 
In table 7, the columns “percsign” refers to the share of regressions where the coefficient of the 
corresponding variable is significant at the specified significance level.  The  results presented in  
the table confirm both the stability of coefficients’ signs (the few cases of changes in sign are 
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related to variables that are not significant in the original regressions) and  the importance of the 
variables identified in this paper.   
We further investigate the reliability of our results by using a larger spectrum of governance 
indicators. As to the role of governance and minority shareholder protection indexes, La Porta et al. 
(1998) claim that common law countries better protect minority shareholders. Hence we consider 
the following country specific indicators of protection of minority shareholders: revised anti 
director rights index17, legal origin18, anti self-dealing index both for targets and acquirers. The 
inclusion of these explicative variables in the econometric specifications displays an impact on 
abnormal returns which is not significantly different from zero. 
Our results also proved robust to the alternative measures of governance. We experiment both 
with the remaining five World Governance indicators (degree of control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability, rule of law and voice and accountability) either separately or as 
difference between acquirer and target’s values and with their arithmetic average (Gover). The 
related coefficient were not significant whereas all the other regression coefficients were virtually 
unaffected. 
  We also use the variable Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital including 
indicators for whether the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other 
than cash and government securities, and whether authorities verify the source of capital. However 
Capital is generally insignificant 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) have investigated the role played by public authorities in 
bailing out their national financial sectors. This might have been a source of positive abnormal 
returns, as some banks may have had a weak capital and liquidity position but may have acquired 
other banks due to the strength implicitly provided by the too-big-too-fail phenomenon. We have 
                                                 
17 Both the origin and the revised anti director rights indices summarize the protection of minority shareholders in the 
corporate decision-making process, including the right to vote. The general principle behind the construction of the 
revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that explicitly mandate, or set as a 
default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders.  
18 As expected, legal origin is correlated with the other two indicators. In unreported results, civil law countries present 
significantly weaker governance indices.   
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constructed a proxy for public intervention (Debt) which is equal to one when the public debt to 
GDP ratio between 2006 and 2009 increased at least of 15 percentage points. Debt has no effects on 
CARs. In addition we have accounted for alternative measure of acquirer strength and size. We 
estimate equation (1) to (6) in table 5, 6a and 6b alternatively using: the debt to equity ratio, our 
fragility indicator, leverage, the log of the market capitalization (instead of the log of the total asset) 
and the ratio of the tangible common equity to tangible asset. Once again our conclusions were not 
substantially affected. 
Finally we use abnormal returns constructed using different banking sector index i.e. FTSE 
World banks and Datastream EU banks. There are no substantial changes to our results as the 
majority of the estimated coefficient keep the sign and significance patterns of the original 
specification.    
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
We conjecture that there may be particular value to acquisitions implemented during a financial 
crisis, and that investors, due to substantial uncertainty, may partially react to announcements of 
acquisitions and provide a premium when the transaction is completed. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that abnormal returns for bank acquirers are zero on average at the 
announcements but positive after completion.  
We further study the cross-section of abnormal returns. Abnormal returns at announcement 
dates are mainly explained by bank characteristics.  Abnormal returns are larger for more efficient 
banks, banks with higher profitability and with less leverage. Buying a national target and 
implementing a friendly deal are also useful characteristics. Interestingly, and contrary to what 
found in previous literature, idiosyncratic volatility is not significant. Paying in cash is bad for 
abnormal returns. This runs contrary to the signalling hypothesis and could be due to investors 
being disappointed by the choice of the acquirer to use cash at times of a credit and liquidity crisis. 
Investors may also be disappointed by insiders holding control of the company. 
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 At completion, market reacts positively in cases of opaque targets and strong regulatory 
environment, presumably  to reward the reduction of uncertainty associated with the materialization 
of the deal. Transactions larger than €1bn and analysts coverage, respectively proxying for visibility 
and speed of information dissemination,  have also  a positive impact on CARs at the nearest 
window. Consistently with the negative idiosyncratic volatility-return relationship highlighted in the 
literature, we find that abnormal returns measured ten days after completion are larger when 
volatility goes up the most before completion. Importantly, we find that terminated deals have a 
negative impact on abnormal returns and that information delays can play a role in explaining the 
sluggish market reaction. 
Overall, it seems that M&A activity in the banking sector during the financial crisis was indeed 
different. Investors attached significant uncertainty to completion of deals, and rewarded successful 
acquisitions with delayed abnormal returns. These findings are relevant for studies of M&A 
spanning longer time periods, possibly involving one or more financial crises. If M&As carried out 
during normal times behave differently than M&As carried out during crises, then empirical studies 
should be careful in considering all observations together. Our research only considers the banking 
sector, but it would be interesting to extend it to other sectors. Evidence presented by Cai, Song and 
Walkling (2011) on long-run anticipation also shows the usefulness of linking M&A activity to the 
economic environment. The more general implication of our study is that the value attached by 
investors to acquisitions may depend on the state of the economy. Researchers should therefore 
avoid mixing observations coming from different regimes.  
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Table 1. M&As transactions: deals characteristics   
 
 Termination/ 
completion   
Year 
    
 2007-
2008 
2009-2010 Total Max  Min Stdev 
# observations 93 46 139    
Average Days between announcement 
and completion (or termination) 
85.20 90.04 86.80 626 1 95.45 
Average Value* EUR millions 2171 629 1682 67824+ 15 7082 
Average percentage sought 61.11 49.08 57.13 100 0 39.51 
Average percentage owned 16.12 25.15 19.11 98 0 31.87 
% deals in same subgroup** 58.06 47.83 54.68    
% deals national*** 29.03 50.00 35.97    
% of cash deal 62.89 45.95 50.36    
% public target 48.38 34.78 43.88    
% target located in EU countries 45.18 47.83 46.08    
% friendly deals 68.82 43.48 60.43    
Note: 
* only disclosed deal 
** where the target and the acquirer belong to the same subgroup. For acquirer banks, the subgroups included in the 
group “banks” are: commercial banks non US; cooperative banks; diversified banking institutions; mortgage banks; 
regional banks non US. As for targets the subgroups included in the group banks are: commercial banks non US; 
commercial banks US; cooperative banks; diversified banking institutions; money center banks,  mortgage banks; 
regional banks non US; special purpose banks.         
*** national indicates that target and acquirer headquarters are in the same country.  
+ it refers to the 2007 terminated deal involving Barclays and ABN Amro, without it the max deal value is €21.35 bn. 
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Table  2. M&As transactions: geographic scatter 
 
Acquirer country  Target country                          
 AU BE BR UK CA CH CZ DE FR GE GR IR IT JP LAT LU NE NO PO PT RO RU SE SLK SP SW ST TU UKR US others  Total 
AU 1                    1 2         2  6 
BE 1      1               1 1 2       1  7 
UK    3             1     1         10  15 
DE        5                         5 
FR  1 1  1    6  1   1        2   2    1  6  22 
GE      1    8  1 1   1             3    15 
GR           2                 1   1  4 
HU                      1           1 
IR                              1 1  2 
IT 1     1    1   9              1  1    14 
LIT               1                  1 
LU                               1  1 
NE                               2  2 
NO        1          2        1       4 
PO                   2          2    4 
PT   1                 1     1      2  5 
SP   1 1  2                   6   2  5 1  18 
SW        1              2       2    5 
ST                           5    3  8 
          
          
Total  3 1 3 4 1 4 1 7 6 9 3 1 10 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 9 1 2 9 1 6 3 9 6 30  139 
Note: 
AU (Austria); BE (Belgium); BR(Brazil); CA(Canada); CH(China); CZ(Czech Republic); DE (Denmark); FR(France); GE(Germany); GR(Greece); 
HU(Hungary); IR(Ireland); IT(Italy); JP(Japan); LAT(Latvia); LIT (Lithuania); LU(Luxemburg); NE(Netherland); NO(Norway); PO (Poland); PT(Portugal); RO 
(Romania); RU (Russian Republic); SE (Serbia); SLK(Slovakia) SP(Spain); SW(Sweden); ST (Switzerland); TU (Turkey); UK (United Kingdom); UKR 
(Ukraine);US (United States). 
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Table 3. ACARs  and CARs statistical description 
 
Around 
announcement 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T test stat 
ACAR[-10,+10] 0.0098961 0.070492 -0.1766288 0.2634333 1.6551* 
ACAR[-10,+5] 0.0097135 0.0689196 -0.1312673 0.3655919 1.6617* 
ACAR[-10,-5]        0.0090970 0.0391706 -0.0677297 0.1876822 2.7381*** 
ACAR[-5,+10] -0.0005435 0.0509233 -0.1452844 0.1473456 -0.12580 
ACAR[-5,+5] -0.0007261 0.0539369 -0.1408297 0.2745465 -0.15870 
ACAR[-1,+1] 0.0008042 0.0281737 -0.0823943 0.0921893 0.33650 
ACAR[0,+5] 0.002386 0.0403558 -0.0823813 0.2176707 0.69700 
Around  
completion 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T test stat 
ACAR[-10,+10]  0.0232098 0.0785951 -0.1815986 0.2737239 3.4816*** 
ACAR[-5,+10] 0.0154313 0.0629223 -0.1137862 0.2651467 2.8914*** 
ACAR[-5,+5] 0.0062729 0.0519747 -0.0988714 0.1597723 1.4229 
ACAR[-1,+1] -0.0003293 0.0271342 -0.1515720 0.109283 -0.1431 
ACAR[0,+1] 0.0000642 0.0214482 -0.0812644 0.0876386 0.03530 
ACAR[0,+5] 0.0072923 0.0375289 -0.0854738 0.1516918 2.2909** 
ACAR[0,+7] 0.0108452 0.0425952 -0.0881651 0.1518328 3.0018*** 
ACAR[0,+10] 0.0151637 0.0479454 -0.1017041 0.1900894 3.7288*** 
ACAR[0,+20] 0.0238088 0.0686559 -0.2087239 0.2498289 4.0885*** 
 
*Significance level 10%;**significance level 5%;*** significance level 1%. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics  
 
Exogenous Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   
Abn returns_ac  139  0.0003 0.0045 -0.0098 0.0272 
Delta volatility  139 1.2334 0.6263 0.2642 3.2751 
Volatility 139 10.0843 5.9249 2.3213 38.0855 
   
Efficiency  139   63.9070   22.4340  27.7300  140.5900 
Equity 119 -3.64e-21  0.0010  -0.0010  0.0030 
Assets 132 18.6810 1.9830 13.3130 21.8630 
Pb  134 1.4180 0.7500 0.0500 4.0300 
Roe 132 11.3650 10.4120 -36.7120 32.7200 
Leverage  119 0.7178 0.2412 0.0322 0.9333 
Lmktcap  128 9.3475 2.1098 3.8308 12.2589 
Teq 131 19.7449 29.9484 0.9 100 
Debteq 118 7.4612 10.3905 0.1800 51.9100 
Fragility  118 48.0014 26.3737 4.0800 100 
   
Concentration 139 0.7030 0.1890 0.2730 1 
Capital 139 6.2380 1.9800 2 9 
Official 139 9.2880 2.2660 5 14 
   
Anti director rights 139  3.4930  1.0460  2 5 
Anti self-dealing 139  0.4270  0.2060  0.1810  0.9500 
Delta regulatory quality  139  0.6187  0.8717 -0.7798 2.4693 
Gover_ta 139 0.5771 0.8729 -1.0047 1.9206 
Gover 139 1.2335 0.3729 0.5310 1.8372 
Note: see the Appendix for variable  descriptions and data sources
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Table 5. Cross sectional OLS regression bidder CAR [1,+1] around the announcement date 
Robust standard error and Student t, bank-level variables and  volatility measures are  winzorized at 1% and 99% level.  
 
*Significance level 10%;**significance level 5%;*** significance level 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Exogenous 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Coef t   Coef t   Coef t   Coef t  Coef t   Coef t   
Volatility                 -0.0003 -0.57   -0.0003 -0.52   
Efficiency  -0.0002 -2.19 ** -0.0002 -2.05 ** -0.0002 -1.90 * -0.0002 -1.92 * -0.0002 -2.06 ** -0.0002 -2.08 ** 
Roe 0.0006 2.45 ** 0.0005 2.26 ** 0.0005 2.50 ** 0.0005 2.24 ** 0.0004 1.45   0.0005 1.67 * 
Friendly 0.0193 4.14 *** 0.0194 4.15 *** 0.0173 3.69 *** 0.0174 3.60 *** 0.0178 3.73 *** 0.0180 3.48 *** 
Cash -0.0111 -2.41 ** -0.0112 -2.36 ** -0.0126 -2.65 *** -0.0121 -2.49 ** -0.0118 -2.39 ** -0.0122 -2.42 ** 
National 0.0129 2.47 ** 0.0134 2.57 ** 0.0140 2.69 *** 0.0143 2.67 *** 0.0148 2.66 *** 0.0154 2.73 *** 
Public         0.0062 0.95   0.0056 0.85  0.0052 0.77   0.0046 0.67   
Equity 10.7482 2.85 *** 10.8935 2.86 *** 11.1885 2.53 ** 11.2269 2.52 ** 11.5514 2.50 ** 9.1304 1.89 * 
Pb                      -0.0012 -0.25   
Assets         0.0013 0.69   0.0013 0.73  0.0014 0.76   0.0014 0.67   
Concentration              0.0034 0.25  0.0071 0.48   0.0114 0.76   
Official         -0.0001 -0.10   -0.0002 -0.18  -0.0001 -0.05   -0.0005 -0.40   
Capital                 -0.0012 -0.87   -0.0012 -0.91   
Transparency         0.0025 1.03   0.0027 1.10  0.0029 1.15   0.0031 1.22   
Analysts     -0.0002 -0.06   -0.0046 -0.74   -0.0049 -0.79  -0.0042 -0.64   -0.0042 -0.64   
Big deals     -0.0041 -0.65   -0.0105 -1.60   -0.0100 -1.48  -0.0112 -1.59   -0.0106 -1.48   
Constant -0.0071 -0.89   -0.0053 -0.44   -0.0275 -0.87   -0.0302 -0.96  -0.0238 -0.70   -0.0217 -0.54   
                           
                           
Obs  119    119     119    119    119    117   
Adjusted  R2  0.21    0.19     0.22    0.21    0.20    0.20   
Mean VIF  1.10    1.17     1.62    1.65    1.71    1.77   
Country fixed effect   No    No    No   No   No   No   
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Table  6a. Cross sectional OLS regression for bidder CAR [0,+1] around the completion date. 
Robust standard errors and Student t, bank-level variables and volatility measures are winzorized at 1% and 99% level 
 
Exogenous Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Coef t   Coef t   Coef t   Coef t  Coef t   Coef t   
Delta volatility -0.0020 -0.87   -0.0026 -0.99   -0.0026 -0.96   -0.0025 -0.85   -0.0027 -0.90   -0.0025 -0.80   
Abn returns_ac -0.6540 -2.87 *** -0.5749 -2.38 ** -0.5917 -2.23 ** -0.6834 -2.40 ** -0.6528 -2.30 ** -0.7135 -2.32 ** 
Efficiency              5.5E-05 0.67   5E-05 0.61   3.7E-05 0.43   
Friendly                     0.0035 0.93   
Cash                     -0.0009 -0.24   
National 0.0027 0.62   0.0025 0.60   0.0024 0.58   0.0025 0.60   0.0025 0.60   0.0027 0.64   
Public                 -0.0029 -0.51   -0.0031 -0.55   
Pb             0.0043 1.15   0.0044 1.17   0.0040 1.04   
Concentration     -0.0133 -1.10   -0.0136 -1.07   -0.0180 -1.36   -0.0177 -1.33   -0.0178 -1.29   
Official 0.0016 1.70 * 0.0020 1.81 * 0.0020 1.80 * 0.0019 1.55   0.0019 1.52   0.0017 1.37   
Terminated      0.0060 1.39   0.0060 1.38   0.0041 0.85   0.0041 0.85   0.0040 0.83   
Dummy 0309         0.0005 0.13   0.0046 0.75   0.0044 0.72   0.0051 0.83   
Transparency -0.0040 -2.08 ** -0.0036 -2.15 ** -0.0036 -2.18 ** -0.0037 -2.25 ** -0.0030 -1.29   -0.0031 -1.38   
Analysts 0.0047 1.65 * 0.0050 1.74 * 0.0050 1.71 * 0.0058 1.91 * 0.0057 1.84 * 0.0057 1.79 * 
Big deals 0.0129 2.70 *** 0.0112 2.42 ** 0.0112 2.37 ** 0.0123 2.49 ** 0.0126 2.51 ** 0.0130 2.53 ** 
Delta regulatory quality 0.0054 1.98 ** 0.0055 2.05 ** 0.0055 2.04 ** 0.0064 2.20 ** 0.0062 2.14 ** 0.0061 2.11 ** 
Constant -0.0160 -1.28   -0.0103 -0.88   -0.0103 -0.88   -0.0182 -1.22   -0.0178 -1.20   -0.0167 -1.06   
                           
Obs  139    139    139    134    134     134   
Adjusted  R2  0.07    0.07    0.07    0.07    0.06     0.06   
Mean VIF  1.24    1.27    1.31    1.39    1.54     1.54   
Country fixed effect   No     No   No   No   No    No   
*Significance level 10%;**significance level 5%;*** significance level 1%. 
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Table  6b Cross sectional OLS regression for bidder CAR [0,+10] around the completion date.  
Robust standard errors and Student t , bank-level variables and volatility measures are winzorized at 1% and 99% level 
 
Exogenous  Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Coef t   Coef t   Coef t   Coef t  Coef t   Coef t   
Delta volatility 0.0222 3.16 *** 0.0212 2.88 ** 0.0213 2.85 ** 0.0213 2.79 *** 0.0211 2.67 *** 0.0168 2.16 ** 
Abn returns_ac         -0.1049 -0.18   -0.1970 -0.32   -0.1766 -0.28   -0.1758 -0.27   
Efficiency  -0.0003 -1.93 * -0.0003 -1.91 * -0.0003 -1.82 * -0.0003 -1.70 * -0.0003 -1.72 * -0.0002 -1.43   
Friendly             -0.0038 -0.47   -0.0037 -0.46   -0.0024 -0.28   
Cash -0.0193 -2.21 ** -0.0199 -2.23 ** -0.0188 -2.07 ** -0.0205 -2.27 ** -0.0206 -2.27 ** -0.0153 -1.69 * 
National             -0.0107 -1.05   -0.0107 -1.04   -0.0089 -0.84   
Public                 -0.0029 -0.34   -0.0024 -0.28   
Assets                     0.0006 0.20   
Concentration 0.0389 1.87 * 0.0404 1.91 * 0.0414 1.95 * 0.0391 1.84 * 0.0393 1.85 * 0.0434 1.94 * 
Terminated  -0.0206 -2.59 ** -0.0243 -2.35 * -0.0225 -2.08 * -0.0222 -2.12 * -0.0222 -2.12 ** -0.0196 -1.86 * 
Dummy 0309 -0.0175 -2.15 ** -0.0171 -2.07 ** -0.0181 -1.97 ** -0.0163 -1.72 * -0.0165 -1.73 * -0.0183 -1.58   
Transparency         -0.0030 -0.88   -0.0025 -0.74   -0.0018 -0.49   -0.0037 -0.95   
Analysts     0.0021 0.34   0.0038 0.61   0.0029 0.48   0.0029 0.46   0.0044 0.50   
Big deals     0.0089 0.72   0.0128 0.99   0.0122 0.94   0.0125 0.96   0.0149 1.07   
Delta regulatory quality         0.0015 0.32   -0.0012 -0.22   -0.0013 -0.23   0.0011 0.17   
Minors nocoverage 0.0189 2.01 ** 0.0221 2.15 ** 0.0221 2.11 ** 0.0228 2.16 ** 0.0229 2.16 ** 0.0179 1.64 * 
Constant -0.0125 -0.58 * -0.0174 -0.84   -0.0160 -0.73   -0.0068 -0.29   -0.0066 -0.28   -0.0186 -0.35   
                          
Obs  139    139    139    139    139    132   
Adjusted  R2  0.14    0.13    0.11    0.11    0.10    0.07   
Mean VIF  1.16    1.24    1.30    1.34    1.49    1.64   
Country fixed effect   No     No   No   No   No   No   
*Significance level 10%;**significance level 5%;*** significance level 1%. 
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Table 7.  Robustness Checks (robust standard errors and Student t)  
Section a: at announcement, 512 estimated regressions 
Core variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level PercSign.10%level Perc+ Perc- Avgt Obs 
Efficiency -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 71% 100% 0% 100% 2.0474 512
Roe 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 68% 87% 100% 0% 2.1243 512
Friendly 0.0207 0.0167 0.0185 0.0048 100% 100% 100% 0% 3.8631 512
Cash -0.0103 -0.0127 -0.0115 0.0048 100% 100% 0% 100% 2.4204 512
National 0.0151 0.0120 0.0135 0.0054 100% 100% 100% 0% 2.5001 512
Equity 11.7746 9.9647 10.8506 4.1495 100% 100% 100% 0% 2.6286 512
Testing  variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level PercSign. 10%level Perc+ Perc- Avgt Obs 
Volatility 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0004 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.3872 256
Assets 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0016 0% 0% 96% 4% 0.5435 256
Public 0.0108 0.0043 0.0074 0.0057 25% 50% 100% 0% 1.3840 256
Concentration 0.0101 -0.0003 0.0051 0.0138 0% 0% 98% 2% 0.3625 256
Official 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0012 0% 0% 5% 95% 0.3312 256
Capital -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0010 0.0012 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.8058 256
Transparency 0.0042 0.0013 0.0028 0.0021 25% 42% 100% 0% 1.4310 256
Analysts 0.0006 -0.0063 -0.0031 0.0054 0% 0% 3% 97% 0.5527 256
Big deals -0.0039 -0.0120 -0.0089 0.0067 0% 2% 0% 100% 1.3079 256
Section b:  at completion,  512 estimated regressions CAR [0,+1] 
Core variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level  PercSign. 10%level Perc+ Perc- Avg t Obs
Abn returns_ac -0.5176 -0.8216 -0.6661 0.2610 99% 100% 0% 100% 2.5596 512
Analysts 0.0061 0.0039 0.0050 0.0030 0% 62% 100% 0% 1.6656 512
Official 0.0021 0.0012 0.0017 0.0011 0% 26% 100% 0% 1.5273 512
Transparency -0.0034 -0.0043 -0.0039 0.0017 100% 100% 0% 100% 2.2665 512
Big deals 0.0142 0.0106 0.0124 0.0048 100% 100% 100% 0% 2.6152 512
Delta regulatory quality 0.0064 0.0045 0.0054 0.0026 100% 100% 100% 0% 2.1205 512
Testing variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level PercSign. 10%level Perc+ Perc- Avg t Obs
Concentration_aq -0.0114 -0.0194 -0.0149 0.0128 0% 0% 0% 100% 1.1590 256
Terminated 0.0067 0.0029 0.0052 0.0046 0% 0% 100% 0% 1.1315 256
Dummy 0309 0.0071 -0.0007 0.0028 0.0048 0% 0% 95% 5% 0.5484 256
National 0.0040 0.0020 0.0030 0.0043 0% 0% 100% 0% 0.7069 256
Efficiency 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0% 0% 100% 0% 0.3447 256
Pb 0.0053 0.0021 0.0035 0.0032 0% 0% 100% 0% 1.1028 256
Cash 0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0006 0.0038 0% 0% 23% 77% 0.2024 256
Friendly 0.0044 0.0027 0.0036 0.0036 0% 0% 100% 0% 1.0033 256
Delta volatility -0.0018 -0.0033 -0.0024 0.0029 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.8434 256
 32 
Section c: at completion512 estimated regressions CAR [0,+10] 
Core variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level PercSign. 10%level Perc+ Perc- Avg t Obs
Delta volatility 0.0231 0.0164 0.0196 0.0081 100% 100% 100% 0% 2.4346 512
Minors nocoverage 0.0252 0.0132 0.0196 0.0108 29% 69% 100% 0% 1.8079 512
Cash -0.0121 -0.0214 -0.0170 0.0092 29% 84% 0% 100% 1.8444 512
Concentration 0.0604 0.0366 0.0484 0.0232 71% 100% 100% 0% 2.0861 512
Terminated -0.0073 -0.0298 -0.0180 0.0095 45% 72% 0% 100% 1.8846 512
Dummy 0309 -0.0116 -0.0274 -0.0182 0.0091 46% 80% 0% 100% 2.0022 512
Testing variables Max Min Mean Avg std PercSign. 5%level PercSign. 10%level Perc+ Perc- Avg t Obs
National -0.0005 -0.0122 -0.0066 0.0087 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.7637 256
Debt 0.0193 0.0010 0.0122 0.0116 0% 1% 100% 0% 1.0590 256
Transparency -0.0006 -0.0055 -0.0036 0.0032 0% 1% 0% 100% 1.1365 256
Equity 19.9189 7.7084 14.5796 7.4500 49% 68% 100% 0% 1.9549 256
Friendly 0.0000 -0.0080 -0.0048 0.0083 0% 0% 0% 100% 0.5809 256
Pb 0.0021 -0.0083 -0.0034 0.0064 0% 0% 17% 83% 0.5770 256
Assets 0.0048 -0.0014 0.0019 0.0026 4% 10% 90% 10% 0.8414 256
Analysts 0.0121 0.0011 0.0059 0.0080 0% 3% 100% 0% 0.7766 256
Big deals 0.0189 0.0061 0.0115 0.0136 0% 0% 100% 0% 0.8392 256
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APPENDIX  Description of Variables appearing in Tables 5 and 6a and 6b 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Abn returns_ac Acquirer abnormal return between announcement and completion date 
Our calculations on 
Thomson Reuter data 
Concentration Asset of the three largest commercial bank to total mkt asset in the acquirer country the year prior to the deal 
DICE CEisIFo–World 
Bank 
Big deals Dummy variable whose value is 1 when the deal  value is greater or equal to €1bn and 0 otherwise 
Our calculations on 
Bloomberg data 
Capital 
Index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, including 
indicators for whether the sources of funds that count as 
regulatory capital can include assets other than cash and 
government securities, and whether authorities verify the 
source of capital 
World Bank 
Cash Dummy variable whose value is 1 when the deal is paid cash or debt zero otherwise Bloomberg 
Efficiency Efficiency ratio (ratio between expenditures and total revenues) Bloomberg 
Delta regulatory 
quality 
Differential between acquirer and target country regulatory 
quality. Regulatory quality measures the ability of the 
government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations.  
Our calculations on 
World Governance 
Indicators Data, 
World Bank 
Analysts 
Dummy variable that takes value zero if – over the time 
period in exam -  the  number of Bloomberg analysts 
covering the acquirer bank is less or equal to two,  one if the 
number of analysts is more than two and less than ten,  two if 
there are more than ten analysts     
Bloomberg 
Dummy 0309 Dummy variable taking value of 1 for deal completed after march 2009  
Public Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when the target is public 
 
Our calculations on 
Bloomberg data 
Friendly Dummy variable taking the value of 1  when the deal is announced to be on friendly basis vs the target’s managers Bloomberg 
Delta volatility Acquirer  return idiosyncratic volatility ratio vol2/vol1 Our calculations on Thomson Reuter data 
Assets Log of total asset on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Equity Tangible equity to asset ratio orthogonalized with respect to size(Assets) 
Our calculations on 
Bankscope data 
Minors nocoverage 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 when deal value is less 
than €250mn and  there are  less than 3 analysts covering the  
acquirer’s activity. 
Our calculations on 
Bloomberg data 
National Dummy  variable taking the value of 1 when acquire and target headquarter are located in the same country Bloomberg 
Official 
Index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory 
agency, including the rights of the supervisor to meet with 
and demand information from auditors, to force a bank to 
change the internal organizational structure, to supersede the 
rights of shareholders, and to intervene in a bank 
World bank 
Pb Price to book ratio on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Roe Return on equity on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Terminated Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when deal is terminated Bloomberg 
Transparency Dummy representing  the degree of transparency of the Our calculations on 
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target. It takes values 0 to 4 in relation to the availability of  
economic information  
Bloomberg and 
Bankscope data 
Volatility Return idiosyncratic volatility from 250 days to 5 days prior the  announcement 
Our calculations on  
Thomson Reuter data 
 
 
 
Other variables   
Anti director rights 
Revised anti-director rights index covers the following areas: 
(1) vote by mail; (2) obstacles to the actual exercise of the 
right to vote (i.e., the requirement that shares be deposited 
before the shareholders’ meeting); (3) minority 
representation on the board of directors through cumulative 
voting or proportional representation; (4) an oppressed 
minority mechanism to seek redress in case of expropriation; 
(5) preemptive rights to subscribe to new securities issued by 
the company; and (6) the right to call a special shareholder 
meeting. 
Djankov et al. (2008)*
Anti self-dealing 
Numerical measure of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against self-dealing by corporate insiders. 
Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-
dealing. Measures the intensity of regulation of self-dealing 
along a variety of dimensions, covering both public and 
private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, 
approval, and litigation 
Djankov et al. 
(2008)*. 
Debteq Debt to equity ratio on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Debt 
Dummy that takes value 1 when the change in the  
government debt  to GDP ratio between 2006 and 2009 is 
above 15% 
Our computations on 
IMF WEO Data 
Fragility 
Ratio between the sum of deposits from other banks other 
deposits and short term borrowing over total deposits plus 
money market and short term funding on the year prior the 
year of the deal 
Bankscope 
Gover 
Arithmetic average of the following indicators: control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and voice an accountability 
World Bank/ World 
Governance Indicators 
2010 
Legal origin Dummy  variable  that takes value 1  when the country has civil law as legal origin Djankov et al. (2008)*
Leverage Short plus long term funding on total asset on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Lmktcap Log mkt capitalization on the year prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
Vol1_idio Return idiosyncratic volatility from 35 to 5 days prior the announcement 
Our calculations on  
Thomson Reuter data 
Vol2_idio Return idiosyncratic volatility from 1 day after the announcement to 1 day prior the completion 
Our calculations on  
Thomson Reuter  data
Subgroup Dummy variable taking the value of 1 when acquirer and target belong to the same business sub-group Bloomberg 
Teq Tangible common equity to tangible asset on the year  prior the year of the deal Bankscope 
 Subscript  
Ta Variable referring to the target  
 
* Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-465. 
 
